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A stra t 
The legacy of Versailles is a rather well-defined and thoroughly researched area in the 
discipline of History. But what did the Treaty of Versailles and the events surrounding 
the peace conference give to the discipline of International Relations  In order to answer 
this  uestion, the article first examines the place of Versailles in the foundational myths 
of the discipline. After that, in the second part, it briefly reviews the most persistent and 
influential ideas in IR which have emerged during the construction of the new world order 
of the time, putting a special emphasis on the concept of national self-determination as 
the “new master principle” of the international society after Versailles. 
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Intro u tion 
As the 100th anniversary of the Versailles Peace Treaty is passing by, circles of historians 
fondly commemorate the well-known and much recited events of the peace conference, 
their background and their far-reaching conse uences. The debates and controversies 
within the historiography of Versailles have been present since the very days of the 
negotiations  the books and studies written on the various historical perspectives, 
contradictions and standpoints have filled several libraries during the past one-hundred 
years (for the historiography of Versailles, see the article by Baranyi Tamás in this issue 
of COJOURN). The legacy of Versailles is a rather well-defined and thoroughly 
 
1 Kinga Szálkai is an assistant professor at the Department of International Relations and European Studies 
at E tv s  oránd University. 
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researched area in the discipline of History. But what did the Treaty of Versailles and the 
events surrounding the peace conference give to the discipline of International Relations  
 If we take a closer look at IR and its perspectives on Versailles2, we encounter 
statements that may be surprising upon first glance. For example, Anievas claims that 
“the theoretical significance of Versailles for IR can hardly be overstated” (Anievas, 
201 :  19), but then, in the same article, he goes on to insert a footnote referring to 
Randall Schweller’s (2001) observation that “there are surprisingly few substantive 
studies within IR specifically examining the making of peace settlements and particularly 
Versailles” (Anievas, 201 :    ). 
In fact, both statements are true. On the one hand, according to its most 
widespread foundational myth, even the birth of IR as a discipline is inseparable from 
Versailles and the surrounding controversies culminating in the signature of the peace 
treaty in 1919. Although the development of the discipline was undoubtedly a longer 
process, several new principles and approaches were articulated during the negotiations 
concerning the new world order after WWI, which have defined IR since then. On the 
other hand, the notion of Versailles and the direct references to the related events as 
formative sources of IR theory are mentioned in detail only on a few occasions, especially 
in the form of inserting IR-related elements in studies about the history of the peace 
conference and its aftermath (e.g. Boemeke et al, 199   Smith, 201 ), and not  i e  er a. 
In spite of its assumed significance, neither IR textbooks (e.g. Steans et al. 2010  Smith 
et al., 201   Baylis et al., 201   Jackson et al., 201 ), nor canonized classical readings of 
IR theory (e.g. Carr, 19    19 9   Morgenthau, 19  ) refer to the treaty, the peace 
conference and the conse uences in detail  they only reference these sub ects in sweeping 
generalisations, and treat them as self-explanatory.  
 The aim of this article is to shed more light on the relationship between Versailles 
and the foundations of IR theory, reviewing the place and importance of the negotiations 
to the discipline. In order to do so, the article first examines the place of Versailles in the 
foundational myths of the discipline. After that, in the second part, it briefly reviews the 
most persistent and influential ideas in IR which have emerged during the construction of 
the new world order of the time, putting a special emphasis on the concept of national 
 
2 In this article, the notion  Versailles’ does not only refer to the Treaty of Versailles concluded with the 
German Reich, or the Paris Peace Conference.  Versailles’ here comprises all negotiations and 
controversies which surrounded the creation of the new world order which emerged in the last years and in 
the aftermath of WWI. 
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self-determination as the “new master principle” of the international society after 
Versailles (Osiander, 199 : 2  ). 
 
  e    t  Anniversar  of t e  irt  of a  is i line    e  la e of  ersailles in t e 
 oun ation of I  
 
T e T in To er   o   er aille  and   ery t yt  
In 2019, scholars of IR commemorate not only the centenary of the Treaty of Versailles. 
The 100th anniversary of the foundation of the first university institution in International 
Relations (the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics at the University College 
of Wales), in Aberystwyth in 1919, is another memorable event, which draws attention 
to the often-emphasized fact that the closing of WWI, the Paris peace negotiations, and 
the surrounding controversies were decisive elements in the establishment of IR as a 
discipline, and directly led to the necessity of its institutionalisation in the academic 
sphere. However, it is not possible to commemorate this symbolic turning point without 
considering the extensive works of revisionist historians and IR theorists, who have 
recently clarified the arbitrariness of presenting this period as the birth year (or, as its 
criti ues write, the  overnight’ birth  de Carvalho et al., 2011:     ) of the discipline. 
 According to its most widespread foundational myth, the need for the discipline 
of IR was created by the desire to eliminate and prevent wars, and directly stemmed from 
the devastating events and conse uences of WWI. In this period of time – so the myth 
goes –, scholars had first turned their gaze to the international as an autonomous domain 
of theoretisation on its own right (de Carvalho et al., 2011:    ). In 19 9, even Carr 
argued that before 191 , “nowhere, whether in universities or in wider intellectual circles, 
was there organised study of current international affairs” (Carr, 19    19 9 : 1). In this 
sense, the establishment of the first IR chair in Aberystwyth could not have been imagined 
without the peace negotiations in Versailles, and the former was a logical conse uence of 
the latter – both reinforcing the foundational myth of IR. 
 Carr’s statement is, however, not true. With the strengthening interest in the 
history of the discipline after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of numerous 
criti ues of its mainstream schools, the roots of IR have also become revisited. Research 
underlined that during the last decades of the 19th century, debates about classical IR-
 
  The original expression “the twin towns of Versailles and Aberystwyth” was coined by de Carvalho et al. 
(2011:   9). 
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related issues, such as great power politics, imperialism, geopolitics and trade evolved, 
while in 1  0, the first Political Science Department in the US was established at 
Columbia University, dealing with the systematic study of international politics, among 
others (de Carvalho et al., 2011:    ). According to Schmidt, the first book that could be 
 ualified as IR was published two decades before the alleged birth of the discipline, in 
1900, by Paul Reinsch, with the title  orld Politi   at t e  nd o  t e  ineteent   ent ry 
(Schmidt, 199 :  0). Vitalis mentions that related to the expanding colonial 
administrations of the great powers, several new courses were opened at universities 
which dealt with international relations. Publications on related topics were also 
encouraged (Vitalis, 200 : 1  ), such as the predecessor of the prestigious IR  ournal 
 oreign    air , which was established in 1910 under the name of the  o rnal o   a e 
 e elo ment (de Carvalho et al., 2011:    ). In 192 , allegedly  ust five years after the 
official birth year of the discipline, a textbook with the title  nternational  elation  
(written by Buell) and a collection titled Sylla    on  nternational  elation  (written by 
Moon) were published, accumulating knowledge created during the previous decades 
concerning war, imperialism, militaries and armaments in the international sphere 
(Vitalis, 200 : 1  ), proving that IR was not in fact born  overnight’ in 1919. 
 
 n t e  ear ie  o   eali t   Great  e ate   Great  arrati e  
Versailles and the surrounding controversies are also assumed to have created a turning 
point that initiated the so-called  First Great Debate’ between Idealism and Realism in 
the 1920s–19 0s. According to the mainstream historical narrative of IR (see  uirk and 
Vigneswaran, 200 : 99–10 ), this was the beginning of a line of debates which have been 
forming the main views and assumptions of the emerging schools of the discipline until 
today. This narrative on the  Great Debates’, as revisionist historians and IR theorists 
have also proved, is no less fictional than that of the birth of the discipline in 1919 – 
however, it undeniably represents the nature of the development of IR in a concise form. 
 The history of IR was rather under-emphasized even as late as in the 19 0s–19 0s, 
and discussions about the development of the discipline only went back to the time of 
WWII (Donnelly, 199 : 1 1). The narrative on the  Great Debates’ referring to 1919 as 
the starting point of the  Idealist–Realist’ divide was established as an outcome of the 
dominant position of Realism in IR during the Cold War years, especially after WWII 
and in the 19 0s–19 0s. IR scholars often treat history as a multitude of events on which 
theories can be applied, and in their attempts to do so, they fre uently ignore where those 
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events are rooted historically (Ashworth, 2002:   ). It was not otherwise in the case of 
Versailles and the surrounding controversies. In the analysis of these, Realists of the Cold 
War narrowed their focus to an extreme extent to be able to discredit  iberalism and 
vindicate their own theories, so as to strengthen their own dominant position within the 
discipline. In the meantime, they tended to oversimplify and understate the significance 
of many details of the events of the period, as it fit their narrative. The Realist narrative 
of the  First Great Debate’ thus emphasizes the victory of Carr, Morgenthau and Niebuhr 
over the allegedly rather na ve but benevolent,  legalistic-moralistic’ idealists of Wilson, 
Angell and Zimmern, who supported ideas that served as the main foundations of liberal 
internationalism in the 20th century. This narrative argues not only that Realism won the 
 First Great Debate’ by offering a more accurate and practically more applicable 
worldview than  iberalism, but also emphasizes that the failure of  Idealism’ in both 
theory and practice was the reason which led the world to the bloodshed of WWII. The 
resulting myth discredited liberal internationalism for a long time. 
 The historical narratives of IR, however, are sub ects to constant change.  iberals 
were thus, eventually, able to rehabilitate their “predecessors” in the 1920s and 19 0s. 
Other lessons were drawn regarding the fictionality of the narrative of the  Great 
Debates’. As  iberalism had established and strengthened itself as a mainstream school 
of IR in the 19 0s–19 0s, the understanding and the label of the  Idealist’ side in the 
 First Great Debate’ also began to shift. “Idealist liberalism”, “liberal idealism”, “classical 
liberalism” are all expressions that are in use to refer to the loosely defined group of ideas 
emerging in the context of Versailles and the surrounding controversies. Several of these 
ideas were later used as the foundations on which the  iberal school of IR could develop. 
The changing labels signify the attempts of followers of  iberalism to (similarly to the 
earlier efforts of Realists) extrapolate  iberalism’s presence to the time of the alleged 
birth of the discipline, thus giving it more legitimacy and weight by “virtue” of stemming 
from the era of Versailles.    
 
Beyond  o ndational Myt   
Overall, as revisionist historians and IR theorists have proven, the myth of the birth of IR 
in 1919 is a product of “an ahistorical extrapolation backwards of current developments 
and concerns in international relations” (de Carvalho et al., 2011:    )  there were no 
defining  Great Debates’ taking place in the strict sense of the tern. Rather, there 
developed multiple parallel discourses on several diverging issues. If there is a period to 
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be named as the time of the birth of the discipline, the years following WWII would be 
much more suitable for this aim (Schmidt, 199   Guilhot, 200 ). However, the legacy of 
Versailles and the surrounding controversies still appear as the cornerstone and the 
starting point of the discipline. The symbolic meaning of 1919 has been built into the 
mainstream historical narratives, and – with the necessary source criticism – continues to 
serve as a useful tool to illustrate the nature, the main agenda and the diverging 
assumptions of IR for beginners as well as the broader interested public. Students of IR 
encounter the notion of the  First Great Debate’ almost without exception. They are also 
ac uainted, typically, with Wilsonian Idealism, the  eague of Nations and national self-
determination in the first months of their studies – which are then repeatedly referenced, 
again and again, in the course of their becoming scholars of IR, regardless of which school 
of IR their respective university institute leans toward. The legacy of Versailles and its 
aftermath is, thus, inherently built into the history and historiography of the discipline of 
IR and remains part of the standard introductory process of anyone who intends to enter 
this field of study. 
 
  e  e a   of  ersailles  elate  Controversies   rin i les an  Criti ues 
 
 e   i loma y  or a  e   orld  rder  
Although the discipline of IR did not begin with a  Big Bang’ (de Carvalho et al., 2011: 
   ) in 1919, Versailles and the surrounding controversies had created an environment 
which encouraged and facilitated its development. Wilson and his followers embarked 
upon the road to redesign the architecture of the international system in the spirit of an 
early liberal internationalism, which led to the emergence of several new principles and 
approaches in the field of IR, and strengthened the significance and position of some 
earlier considerations. In the followings, the article reviews the most persistent and 
influential ideas in IR which have emerged as a conse uence of Versailles. 
 One of the most tangible theoretical principles that have appeared during the 
negotiations was open diplomacy.  As Carr writes in 19 9, “down to 191 , the conduct 
of international relations was the concern of persons professionally engaged in it” (Carr, 
19    19 9 : 1). Foreign offices worked independently of party politics or public 
opinions, while international relations, including warfare, was almost exclusively the 
 
  The principle of open diplomacy, however, was never applied consciously in practice during the Paris 
peace negotiations (see Keylor, 199 :   1–   ). 
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business of high-ranking soldiers and diplomats. The events of WWI contributed to the 
rise of a discourse on a  new diplomacy’, the primary ob ective of which was to make 
international relations more transparent, emphasizing the problems with secret treaties 
and the lack of public involvement in decision-making about international relations 
(Keylor, 199   Weisbrode 201 ).  
 The new approach towards diplomacy and international relations, however, went 
beyond the mere transparency of international relations, and culminated in the creation of 
a whole dictionary of new principles for a new world order. The spirit of the time is 
illustrated well by the ideas of the British Union of Democratic Control (UDC) about the 
rules of a new way of conducting international affairs as early as 191 , in the following 
four points: 1) the population’s consent is necessary for a transfer of territory  2) the 
parliament has to be involved in decisions about international treaties   ) Britain has to 
refrain from alliances that function on the mechanism of the balance of power and use the 
means of an international court for the settlement of its disputes   ) arms reduction. In 
191 , a fifth point was added: the promotion of free trade and the termination of trade 
wars (Knock, 199 :   ). The proposed guidelines of postwar settlement by Wilson  
developed these ideas further. The building blocks of the new world order became 
canonized in the form of his Fourteen Points (191 ), and later appeared in the Treaty of 
Versailles (1919) and in the Covenant of the  eague of Nations (1919). These documents 
articulated the main principles for the reconstruction of the world order, highlighting the 
concepts of open diplomacy, democracy, freedom of the seas, freedom of trade, arms 
reduction, national self-determination, e uality of nations, territorial integrity, the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, international cooperation, and collective security. In this 
form, Versailles and the surrounding controversies did not only lay and strengthen the 
foundations of a new world order, but also those of liberal internationalism and 
 iberalism as a school in IR theory. 
 For the keen eye, the spirit of Versailles and the surrounding controversies may 
also have some features that resemble an early version of an international society, 
although the notion was coined by Bull only in 19  , defined as  
 
  It was, obviously, not Woodrow Wilson who invented the central principles of liberal internationalism. 
The mentioned principles have a rather long history in the development of liberal thought, and they had 
their proponents in Wilson’s era as well. However, in the great narratives of history and IR, and in the 
imagination of the peoples of the world, early liberal internationalism ( Idealism’) became intertwined with 
Wilson’s charismatic (for a while, even messianistic) person in the time of Versailles and the surrounding 
controversies (Manela 200 b: 12 ).  
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“a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, 
form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a 
common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the 
working of common institutions. ( ) recognising certain common interests 
and perhaps some common values, they regard themselves as bound by 
certain rules in their dealings with one another ( ). At the same time they 
cooperate in the working of institutions such as the forms of procedures of 
international law, the machinery of diplomacy and general international 
organisation, and the customs and conventions of war” (Bull, 199   19   : 
1 ). 
In the case of the new world order established in Versailles, common interests and 
common values were articulated in the form of the above-mentioned principles, and the 
basis of international cooperation was created to settle  uestions of international law, 
diplomacy, international institutions and war. Democracy was a very significant building 
block for this early model of international society, and  the principle of public right’ was 
often emphasized in Wilson’s formative speeches (Holsti 199   1991 : 1  ), establishing 
common value-based grounds for mutual understanding at the international level. 
 The existence of this early international society is thoroughly intertwined with the 
principle of collective security. Wilson and his followers argued that the main cause of 
WWI was the instability enhanced by the traditional balance-of-power politics of the great 
powers. Therefore, in the new world order, they put emphasis on the principle of 
collective security to replace the balance-of-power mechanism (Knock 199 : 11 ), 
conceptualized in the Covenant of the  eague of Nations in the following way:  
“(Article 10) The Members of the  eague undertake to respect and preserve 
as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political 
independence of all Members of the  eague. In case of any such aggression 
or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise 
upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.  
(Article 11) Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of 
the Members of the  eague or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to 
the whole  eague, and the  eague shall take any action that may be deemed 
wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.” 
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The key international institution to hold this new international society together and 
implement its common values and interests was the  eague of Nations. Although its 
establishment was surrounded by rather abstract, at times even pathetic, declarations 
about the role of the organization (Wilson compared the  eague to a “searching light of 
conscience” ), it had very tangible and significant benefits both for the  iberal school of 
IR in general, and concerning the theory of international organisations in particular. On 
the one hand, its Covenant contributed to the canonization of the principles of liberal 
internationalism and the broader approach of  iberalism towards the conduct of 
international affairs, institutionalizing international cooperation in several fields, such as 
economy, society, science, technology, and culture (Fleury, 199 :  09). On the other 
hand, even if the  eague was indeed very far from being perfectly constructed, it has 
served the theory of international organisations as a case study for analysis and a model 
to improve, while several existing international organizations proudly trace their roots 
back to the structure and the values upon which the  eague was established (Goodrich, 
19    Davies, 2012). 
 Overall, even though some critical accounts accuse the  eague of discrediting 
international organisations due to its very obvious flaws and failures in practice (Fleury, 
199 :  1 ), the founding principles of the organization survived its existence, and keep 
influencing the development of the United Nations and other international organisations 
in general. As for the new world order constructed by  Wilsonian Idealists’, as the above 
discussion has shown, it provided much more for IR than Realists may have assumed: a 
set of ephemeral principles, a failed attempt at their practical implementation, and an 
organization responsible for much of this failure. In the direct aftermath of Versailles, the 
great powers “accepted Wilsonianism as the foundational discourse for a redesigned 
international system” (Smith, 201 : 2  ), and its reflections in IR theory (both on the 
grand and middle levels) has continued to influence the development of the discipline, 
providing a firm basis for the debates around the following new international orders 
emerging from WWII and the Cold War. 
 
 
  “My conception of the  eague of Nations is  ust this, that it shall operate as the organized moral force of 
men throughout the world and that whenever or wherever wrong and aggression are planned or 
contemplated, this searching light of conscience will be turned upon them and men everywhere will ask, 
“What are the purposes that you hold in your heart against the fortunes of the world ” (Wilson, 192 :   0). 
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 il onian  ationali m  T e  ontro er ial Prin i le o   ational Sel   etermination in 
  ro e 
The new international order was built on nation-states, which brought about one of the 
most heated controversies of the Versailles and interwar era: the issue of national self-
determination. In 191 , Wilson, the most ardent proponent of the concept at the time, 
stated that 
“This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of 
nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim 
to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political life. ( ) 
National aspirations must be respected  peoples may now be dominated and 
governed only by their own consent. ’Self-Determination’ is not a mere 
phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will 
henceforth ignore at their peril” (Wilson, 192 : 1 0). 
As for the Fourteen Points, the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the  eague of 
Nations, national self-determination was not directly mentioned therein,  however, its 
spirit was visible in the territorial decisions redrawing the borders of Europe, and thus, 
with Osiander’s words, it had become the “new master principle” of the international 
society after Versailles (Osiander, 199 : 2  ). 
 The content of the principle, however, was rather vague. The origins of its 
articulation in the peace negotiatons can be traced back to three substantive and 
interrelated principles appearing in Wilson’s speeches: the principle of public right, 
government by consent of the governed, and democracy. On the basis of these, he could 
declare “that nobody has the right to impose sovereignty upon anybody else  that, in 
disposing of the affairs of a nation, that nation or people must be its own master and make 
its own choice” (Wilson, 1919a). The most widely accepted core of the practical 
application of the principle of national self-determinism, the so-called  Wilsonian 
nationalism’, was “to make state frontiers coincide with the frontiers of nationality and 
language” (Hobsbawm, 1992  1990 : 1 2–1  ), which has also often been interpreted as 
being grounded in concepts of political or territorial independence and ethnicity.  
 In practice, however, it proved largely impossible to make borders and 
nationalities coincide in Europe after WWI (see Hobsbawm, 1992  1990 : 1 1–1 2). 
 
  Except for two rather indefinite indications of the concept in Points V and VI, referring to colonies’ and 
Russia’s right to determine their own development. 
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Moreover, the discussion of the practical application of the idea of national self-
determination in Europe was often based on a lack of knowledge or insufficient 
information (see  ynch, 2002). In this sense, the principle of self-determination did not 
only trigger overly great expectations in Central Europe and foster the spread of 
nationalism, but also planted the seeds of in ustice in several parts of the continent 
( ynch, 2002). Although Wilson was committed to the implementation of the principle 
“without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that 
would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and conse uently of the world” 
(Wilson, 191 ), the “new master principle” of the new world order significantly 
contributed to the demise of the Versailles system, generating processes that were in sharp 
contradiction with the other principles of liberal internationalism.  
 Considered as an essential principle of international law (i    ogen ) today, the 
concept first appeared in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations (19  ), and was 
codified in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19  ), 
stating that “all peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.” The principle of national self-determination, supported and spread by 
Wilson and his followers in Versailles, was built on the approaches of liberal 
internationalism and the  iberal school of IR. However, the general vagueness of the 
concept continues to make its practical application in addressing political aspirations of 
independence controversial, up to this day. 
 
 il onian  ationali m   ational Sel   etermination on To r aro nd t e  olonie  
In 1919, the principle of national self-determination resonated not only in Europe, but 
attracted the attention of colonized peoples and their leaders supporting anti-colonial 
nationalism all over the world. The fifth of the Fourteen Points called for 
“a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial ad ustment of all colonial 
claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all 
such  uestions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must 
have e ual weight with the e uitable claims of the government whose title is 
to be determined.” 
In Versailles, however, “non-Western regions and peoples figure most often as inert 
masses of territory and humanity” (Manela, 200 a: x) during the negotiations, discussed 
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only in those rare cases when this served great power interests, and the participation of 
local actors was minimal even in these cases. The Covenant of the  eague of Nations had 
created the mandate system to ensure the development of the colonies of defeated powers 
in its Article 22, stating that “the well-being and development of such peoples form a 
sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be 
embodied in this Covenant”. Nevertheless, in the interwar era, this principle was 
implemented for the benefit of the colonial powers and against the self-determination of 
colonial people.  
 The great powers did not calculate with the incendiary effects of the principle of 
self-determination in the colonial world. However, WWI had not yet ended when they 
already had to face the phenomenon that colonial peoples began lobbying for their own 
nation-states, arguing that on the basis of ethnic consciousness they have a right to 
establish a sovereign state. Argumentations based on  Wilsonian nationalism’ emerged in 
Turkey, Egypt, Vietnam, India, China, Korea, Indonesia, Nigeria and in several other 
parts of Africa, among others (Steigerwald, 1999: 9   Manela 200 b). Similar claims 
were already disturbing enough in the case of Central Europe, where political borders did 
not coincide with nationalities. In the colonial world, the application of national self-
determination was not only even more problematic to implement, it also clearly 
contradicted the interests of great powers, threatening the stability of their colonial rule.  
 Recognising this, Wilson himself entered into lengthy explanations, referring 
“the un ualified hope that men have entertained everywhere of immediate 
emancipation from the things that have hampered them and oppressed them. 
 ou cannot in human experience rush into the light  of self-determination . 
( )  ou have to go through the twilight into the broadening day before the 
noon comes and the full sun is on the landscape” (Wilson, 1919b). 
A more practical line of reasoning by him argued that “it was not within the privilege of 
the conference of peace to act upon the right of self-determination of any peoples except 
those which had been included in the territories of defeated empires.” (Wilson, 192 : 
2  ). These statements undoubtedly meant that the principle of national self-
determination was initially not designed for colonies. Even if some of the imperial powers 
(the German, the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires), which were defeated in 
WWI, collapsed, the British and the French empires were actually strengthened as a 
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conse uence of Versailles, leading to an unprecedented era of European colonial 
expansion (Manela, 200 b: 12 ). 
 Several scholars argue that Versailles and the surrounding debates are textbook 
illustrations of the inherently colonial and Eurocentric nature of IR since its very 
beginnings. Undeniably, in spite of Wilson’s high-toned ideas about the e uality of 
nations, Versailles reflected great power interests that were based on a “colonizer’s model 
of the world” (Saurin, 200 : 2 ), and the decisions were made in an atmosphere of 
Western and European supremacy. There are manifold criticisms concerning the 
motivations and intentions of Wilson, accusing him of supporting American imperialism 
in the Western Hemisphere (Healy, 19    Hall, 199 ), emphasizing the principles of free 
trade and free navigation to foster the exploitation of the colonies (Steigerwald, 1999), or 
the controversial nature of the Wilsonian idea of interventions (Calhoun, 19    Belloni, 
200 ), all imbued with traces of colonialism, Eurocentrism, and racism (Steigerwald, 
1999). 
 Principles, however, can often enhance their discursive spaces and gain additional 
meanings in different contexts regardless of the motivations and intentions of their 
initiators. It was not otherwise in the case of national self-determination, either: in the 
colonial world, the resonance of the notion contributed to the development of the 
theoretical foundations of anti-colonial nationalist movements. On the other hand, the 
following disillusionment with Wilson’s ideas fostered nationalist upheavals all over the 
colonized world, which made it clear that the peoples of the colonies strived for 
recognition in the new world order, and international society has begun its turn “from an 
imperial world order to a postcolonial one” (Manela 200 b: 12 ). The decline of colonial 
powers reached its peak several decades later. The principle of national self-determination 
and  Wilsonian nationalism’ not only contributed to bring about the events of WWII, but 
may thus (rather paradoxically) be named as an important turning point in the history of 
anticolonial movements, providing them with a comprehensive theoretical background to 
channel the manifold tensions and dissatisfaction stemming from the colonial world 
order. These movements, furthermore, have been used as case studies in the theoretical 
reflections of the postcolonial criti ues of IR, further contributing to the development of 
IR as a discipline (see Manela, 200 b). 
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Con lusions 
There is no need to elaborate on the events of the 1920s–19 0s in detail to prove the fact 
that the direct aims of the Treaty of Versailles were not fulfilled, let alone the excessive 
hopes of liberal internationalism about the instant creation of a more peaceful and  ust 
world on the blood-soaked ruins after WWI. The  eague of Nations itself is also often 
considered to be a failure, at least in reaching its declared practical ob ectives, while the 
principle of self-determination may be said to have only ignited tensions in both Europe 
and the colonial world in the interwar period and after. With a view to the development 
of IR, revisionist historians and IR theorists have also proven that the great narrative about 
the glorious  overnight’ birth of the discipline in 1919 is, in the strict sense, mostly a 
blend of the superficial reading of the historical events and the extrapolation of the 
discipline’s contemporary state in the Cold War. However, if we consider the long-term 
impact of Versailles and the surrounding controversies, it is clearly visible that this era 
meant an un uestionably significant and formative time for the study of international 
relations and the establishment of IR as a discipline. 
 From the  iberal point of view, Versailles served as a forum where the 
foundations of the main principles and approaches of liberal internationalism were 
summarized and canonized, contributing to the development of the discipline of IR to 
further the  uest of mankind for a more peaceful and  ust future. From the Realist point 
of view, it symbolises the time and the place where the  strawman’ image of the Idealist 
was born, against which Realist scholars were able to refine and develop their own ideas 
during the aftermath of WWII, in the time of the Cold War. The circumstances under 
which the Treaty of Versailles was discussed, signed and implemented, have also inspired 
the criti ues of IR, especially in the form of anti- and postcolonial theories. The principles 
and approaches that the article has discussed above are typical sub ects of extensive and 
often heated discourses within the discipline, which have emerged from the context of 
Versailles and the surrounding controversies, and keep influencing the development of 
IR since then. From this point of view, the most important achievement of Versailles – 
deserving to be celebrated on the 100th anniversary – lies in the creation of a wide 
discursive space in which the emergence of the principles of IR theory, defining principles 
for the course of the 20th century, was made possible. 
 All things considered, the Treaty of Versailles was built upon a discourse about a 
set of ideas which, in the course of time, developed to define the central field of analysis 
of the discipline. In the meantime, the attempts at the practical implementation of the 
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treaty during the 1920s–19 0s provided IR with a range of instructive case studies to 
analyse and lessons to learn. In this sense, the conclusions support the claim of Anievas 
that “the theoretical significance of Versailles for IR can hardly be overstated” (Anievas, 
201 :  19). 
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